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Mobile data roaming and incentives for 
investment in rural broadband infrastructure  
I. Introduction0F1 
Mobile broadband Internet access is highly 
important to the American economy and 
millions of users. There were almost 200 
million mobile broadband connections by 
the end of 2013 in the United States, far 
more than the number of fixed broadband 
connections (FCC, 2014a, Table 1). The 
economic activity created by the provision 
and usage of mobile broadband is sizeable, 
and has been documented at the national 
level (Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2011; 
Thompson and Garbacz, 2011; Katz, 2012) 
and specifically for rural areas (Whitacre, 
Gallardo, and Strover, 2014). The benefits of 
mobile broadband—and indeed the entire 
broadband ecosystem—depend on 
investment in deploying and upgrading 
network infrastructure by broadband 
providers. Thus investment in mobile 
wireless infrastructure plays a vitally 
important role in sustaining the growth of the 
industry and the economy. Investment is also 
the means by which robust facilities-based 
competition among mobile broadband 
providers develops, to the benefit of 
consumers who enjoy more options, greater 
wireless coverage, and lower prices.  
The significance of wireless investment for 
America implies that there is a high 
opportunity cost to pay in terms of the 
forgone benefits when investment is 
                                                 
1 The author can be contacted at 
james.prieger@pepperdine.edu. 
discouraged. Each dollar not spent on 
investment destroys more than a dollar’s 
worth of economic output and GDP, as well 
as lowering earnings and employment, due to 
the interconnected nature of the economy. 
Given the high opportunity cost of forgone 
investment, it is important to examine public 
policy affecting the mobile broadband 
industry to ensure it does not diminish the 
incentives to invest. Infrastructure does not 
grow by itself. Instead, the network 
deployment underlying today’s broad 
coverage for LTE mobile broadband is the 
result of the more than $170 billion in 
wireless capital expenditure (capex) the 
providers have invested since 2010.1F2 
Preserving incentives and lowering barriers to 
invest thus are paramount.  
Since broad network coverage is a valuable 
aspect of mobility for many customers, 
roaming—the process by which one wireless 
provider uses another provider’s network—
has always played an important role in 
mobile communications. Roaming 
arrangements allow a provider to offer service 
to its customers when they travel to areas 
where the provider holds no spectrum 
licenses, for example, or to serve customers 
temporarily while it builds out its 
infrastructure in areas it does hold licenses. 
                                                 
2 Data from Credit Suisse (2015), FCC (2015b), and 
the major carriers’ 4Q 2015 earnings conference calls 
indicate that wireless capex from mobile voice and 
data service providers in the United States totaled 
about $171.5 billion over 2010-2015.  
 2 
 
Current federal policy toward mobile data 
roaming, however, has the potential to 
discourage investment in infrastructure, and 
indeed appears to have done so. In the last 
decade, public policy regarding mobile 
roaming has moved from allowing great 
leeway in the terms and conditions reached 
in private agreements between providers. 
Instead, today’s rules grant ever more 
bargaining power and lower rates to the party 
requesting roaming from the carrier that 
actually deployed the infrastructure. The 
particular policies of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) toward 
mobile data roaming are reviewed below. 
The policies can be seen generally as 
constituting a form of access regulation. With 
access regulation, rules are promulgated to 
mandate granting rivals access to a carrier’s 
network infrastructure. Access regulation 
enables (artificial) service-based competition, 
as opposed to actual facilities-based 
competition in which both parties invest in 
building competing physical networks. 
The problem with access regulation in 
general and mobile data roaming in particular 
is that mobile broadband providers with 
weaker resources or more risk aversion are 
tempted to delay deploying their own 
infrastructure (Bauer, 2010). Firms with 
resources available for investment have 
incentive to delay, since part of their 
expenditure will accrue to the benefit of their 
rivals. That is, “host providers may have a 
disincentive to invest in their networks if 
other providers can ‘free-ride’ on their 
investment via roaming”—a quotation taken 
(in irony, given the FCC’s later decisions) 
from the FCC’s own data roaming order.2F3 
The result may be that “industry may invest 
less on a per capita basis and consumers may 
consequently experience slower 
improvements of the price/quality ratio over 
time” (Bauer, 2010, p.76). 
The investigation here of the consequences 
of policy in the United States toward mobile 
data roaming begins in the next section with 
discussion of the general importance of 
investment in infrastructure for mobile 
broadband. Part A of section II reviews the 
importance of mobile broadband for rural 
areas, and part B quantifies the opportunity 
cost of a dollar not invested. Section III 
contains an analysis of the disincentivizing 
impact of access regulation. General 
knowledge about access regulation, 
investment, and the diffusion of broadband is 
reviewed in part A of section III. Part B 
presents a review of FCC policy toward data 
roaming and an assessment of the particular 
negative consequences for the economy. The 
analysis indicates that the poor incentives 
created by liberal data roaming policy may 
have cost the economy an estimated $20 
billion in output, $11 billion in GDP, $6 
billion in earnings for workers, and 134,000 
jobs. Under some alternative assumptions, 
these opportunity costs are even larger. 
II. The impact of investment in 
mobile telecom infrastructure 
Investment in the mobile broadband industry 
contributes to economic performance 
through direct and indirect channels. 
Broadband investment boosts growth directly 
through the obvious impacts of the money 
                                                 
3 FCC (2011a), footnote 76. 
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spent on the infrastructure and the 
employment required to deploy it. There are 
several indirect effects of the investment on 
the economy, however. Most immediately, 
the direct spending on infrastructure and 
employment creates ripple effects in the 
economy. When mobile broadband 
providers purchase additional equipment, the 
suppliers of the inputs increase their own 
demand for the inputs needed to produce 
their goods. Similarly, the extra earnings in 
the pockets of workers stimulate 
consumption in the economy at large. Thus, 
each dollar spent on infrastructure 
investment creates more than a dollar’s worth 
of economic activity. 
Mobile technology also induces economic 
growth indirectly through the positive 
externalities provided by mobile 
telecommunications as a general purpose 
technology. Mobile broadband Internet 
access and usage is an increasingly essential 
part of the national and global information 
economy. Broadband is an example of 
general-purpose technology (Prieger, 2013). 
A general-purpose technology is pervasive, 
has high potential for technical 
improvements, is greatly useful to businesses, 
and can be employed to increase the 
productivity of R&D in downstream sectors 
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). A 
general-purpose technology such as 
broadband spreads throughout all aspects of 
the economy and creates productivity gains in 
many industries, within and without the 
broadband ecosystem. A general-purpose 
technology like mobile broadband is thus 
important to the economic health of a region 
and the national economy.  
In this section, the links between broadband 
investment and the economy are reviewed. 
Section A contains a general discussion of the 
importance of mobile broadband and 
investment for rural development. Direct and 
indirect impacts, including non-economic 
effects, are presented and discussed. Section 
B turns to measuring the opportunity costs of 
not investing in mobile broadband. 
Conventional methodology from the United 
States Bureau of Economic Analysis is 
adopted to quantify the economic impact of 
mobile broadband investment.  
A. Mobile broadband is important for 
rural development 
Since data roaming is most common in rural 
areas, the focus of the following discussion 
will be on rural areas. Broadband brings 
benefits of many kinds to rural America. 
This section discusses the economic and 
other impacts of investment in mobile 
broadband and usage of the service. 
1. Economic impacts of investment in 
broadband  
The exploration here of broadband’s impact 
on the economy begins with its direct impact 
on GDP. Next, evidence on the overall 
impacts on GDP and growth is presented. An 
examination of the relationship between 
broadband and employment concludes this 
section. Given the relatively recent explosion 
of mobile broadband usage, many of the 
studies discussed here do not separate 
mobile broadband from fixed Internet 
access. However, given the predominance of 
mobility in the broadband marketplace in 
recent years, the results of these studies are 
applicable to mobile broadband as well. 
Many studies document a positive association 
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between broadband availability and usage 
and economic growth (Holt and Jamison, 
2009). Although nearly all studies on the 
subject conclude that broadband is important 
for economic growth, different studies come 
to widely varying estimates of the impact due 
to differences in methodology and the scope 
of impacts considered. 
Private investment in broadband appears 
directly in GDP.3F4 Given the huge amount 
that broadband providers have invested in 
the United States, the direct contribution of 
infrastructure investment is sizeable. Since 
1999, broadband providers in the United 
States have invested over 1.2 trillion dollars 
in private capital expenditure on fixed and 
mobile broadband.4 F5 Since 2009, investment 
in network infrastructure in the nation has 
averaged about a half of a percent of GDP. 
In 2014, American broadband providers 
invested $78 billion in total infrastructure and 
$32 billion on wireless broadband capex.5F6 
These investments have been required to 
expand steadily the availability and speed of 
fixed and mobile broadband service offered 
to consumers. 
                                                 
4 The main components of GDP as calculated for the 
official estimates are consumption, investment, 
government spending, and net exports. GDP is a gross 
measure, and therefore investment is counted (or 
more properly, gross private domestic investment) 
includes both investment in new fixed assets as well as 
investment to replace depreciated assets (BEA, 2015). 
Due to leakages from imports, a dollar of private 
investment may add less than a dollar to GDP. 
5 The data on capex are from USTelecom 
(www.ustelecom.org/broadband-industry-
stats/investment/historical-broadband-provider-capex), 
who in turn used a variety of industry sources.  
6 The total figure is from USTelecom (see previous 
footnote); the wireless capex is from Credit Suisse 
(2015). 
Broadband Internet access also appears in 
GDP as a consumer and business service. A 
conservative assessment of the direct impact 
of broadband Internet access on GDP begins 
with accepted methodology from the same 
agency that computes the official estimates of 
GDP for the United States. Greenstein and 
McDevitt (2011, 2012) perform two such 
studies to show that the direct impact of 
broadband Internet access as a consumer 
service was approximately $8.3 to $10.6 
billion of new GDP in 2006 ($9.8 to $12.5 
billion in 2015 dollars). For 2010, they find 
that there was an additional $9.1 billion in 
new consumer surplus created by broadband 
(net of what would have accrued with earlier 
technology) that does not show up in GDP. 
Similar calculations show that by 2010, 
broadband is conservatively estimated to have 
created $9.1 billion ($9.9 billion in 2015 
dollars) in new consumer surplus in the US, 
leading to a total “broadband bonus” for the 
economy of $39.8 billion ($43.2 billion in 
2015 dollars).6F7 After accounting for quality 
improvements in broadband, mainly in the 
speed of service, the estimate of consumer 
surplus rises to $95 billion and the overall 
broadband bonus to $126 billion ($103 and 
$136 billion in 2015 dollars, respectively). 
Other estimates that consider indirect 
impacts or that do not carefully net out the 
benefits from replaced technology often 
arrive at figures that are much higher. 
Apart from the national accounting 
approach, econometric estimates allow a 
more inclusive assessment of how mobile 
broadband increases national growth. Such 
                                                 
7 The broadband bonus is calculated as broadband 
revenue less cannibalized dial-up revenue plus new 
consumer surplus. 
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studies can account for all the ways 
broadband affects the economy, albeit 
without necessarily identifying the paths 
between investment and final economic 
outcomes. In one of the studies looking at 
mobile broadband in particular, Gruber and 
Koutroumpis (2011) find a sizable positive 
impact of mobile infrastructure on GDP 
across many years and countries. The 
authors calculate that mobile 
telecommunications contributed 0.4 
percentage points to GDP growth in high-
income countries like the United States. 
Thompson and Garbacz (2011) also found 
econometric evidence that mobile broadband 
has an important effect on GDP—in fact, 
much more important than that of fixed 
broadband. Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011) 
also find that mobile broadband 
infrastructure increases output per worker-
hour, contributing 0.3 percentage points to 
annual productivity growth in countries with 
the highest mobile usage penetration (such as 
the United States). Another notable finding 
from their study is that there are increasing 
returns in the impact of mobile infrastructure 
deployment. Thus, investment in mobile 
broadband infrastructure in rural areas may 
yield more than proportional increases in 
income and employment growth. 
Broadband can be similarly important for 
creating and sustaining employment. As with 
GDP, direct and indirect impacts can be 
distinguished (Katz, 2012). The construction 
of broadband networks creates jobs directly 
through demand for labor to deploy the 
infrastructure and the labor used to 
manufacture and transport the equipment. 
Additionally, investment creates further 
indirect employment in the sectors further 
upstream than the direct suppliers of the 
inputs. Least proximately, but still directly 
related to broadband investment, the extra 
wages generated create additional consumer 
spending, which can induce further usage of 
labor throughout the economy. Several 
studies in recent years calculate employment 
multipliers, defined in this context as the 
ratio of total jobs created (direct, indirect, and 
induced) to direct jobs created from 
broadband investment. Atkinson, Castro, and 
Ezell (2009) find an employment multiplier 
of 3.6 when jobs from all three sources 
mentioned above are included. This implies 
that for each job created directly the 
additional demand for labor to build the 
network, there are 2.6 other jobs created by 
the additional demand in upstream industries 
and induced by additional consumer 
spending. Katz and Suter (2009) found a 
slightly smaller estimate of the comparably 
defined multiplier, 3.4.  
For the overall impact of broadband on 
employment, including the three channels 
from investment described above but also 
impacts from businesses, industries, and 
workers made more productive by 
broadband, we turn to econometric studies. 
Reviews of the literature show that several 
studies find positive links between broadband 
availability and increased employment, 
particularly during the recent recession years 
when there was significant slack in the 
economy (Katz and Suter, 2009; Holt and 
Jamison, 2009; Katz, 2012). More recently, 
Jayakar and Park (2013) find that US 
counties with better broadband availability 
had lower unemployment rates in 2011, even 
after controlling for other factors. Investment 
in mobile broadband infrastructure thus has 
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clear potential to improve the outlook for 
employment in regional and the national 
economies. 
While the employment studies discussed 
above were national in scope, a recent study 
by Whitacre, Gallardo, and Strover (2014) 
examined the impacts of broadband on rural 
areas in particular. By carefully matching 
counties with a high level of broadband 
adoption to observably similar counties with 
lower adoption, the authors are able to isolate 
the effect of adoption on how employment 
and other economic outcomes changed 
between 2001 and 2010. The study is notable 
both for its focus on rural counties and for 
having a credible econometric approach to 
identify the causal effect of broadband on 
employment. They find that non-
metropolitan counties with high levels of 
broadband adoption (defined as adoption 
rates above 60%) had significantly greater 
reductions in the unemployment rate when 
compared with otherwise similar counties 
with less adoption. They also find that non-
metropolitan counties with low levels of 
broadband adoption (below 40%) had 
significantly lower increases in employment 
levels, compared with similar counties with 
more adoption. The same study finds that 
broadband adoption in rural areas leads to 
higher increases in household income and 
greater growth in the number of businesses. 
Another notable result is that the availability 
of higher broadband speeds in non-
metropolitan counties is associated with 
greater reductions in the poverty level 
compared to otherwise similar counties, 
which the authors interpret as “suggesting that 
broadband speed can potentially contribute 
to general community well-being” (p.1020). 
These finding are generally in accord with an 
earlier study of rural areas using a similar 
matching methodology. Stenberg et al. (2009) 
paired each of 228 rural counties with a 
similar county that had low broadband 
availability. As in the study by Whitacre et al. 
(2014), the set of similar counties served as a 
control group. Over the years 2002-2006, the 
group of early-adopting counties experienced 
more job growth, particularly in the nonfarm 
sector. Broadband-available counties also had 
higher personal income and nonfarm 
earnings growth in some of the years. Not all 
of the apparent benefits of broadband 
Stenberg et al. found are statistically 
significant, but the counties with low 
broadband availability in 2000 never 
significantly outperformed the high 
availability group in any year of the study. 
2. Other impacts of investment in 
broadband 
Apart from the economic impacts of 
broadband investment and usage of 
broadband service discussed in the previous 
section, there are many other ways that 
investment in the availability of mobile 
broadband can improve the quality of life in 
rural areas. A few examples of benefits of 
broadband that are of particular interest for 
rural communities are increased community 
involvement, greater labor market 
opportunities through telework, and 
increased human capital through distance 
learning and telemedicine (Stenberg et al., 
2009).7F8 The Internet can foster community 
interaction by lowering the cost of engaging in 
civic affairs and participating in community 
involvement. For example, it is much easier 
                                                 
8 This section draws on the discussion in Prieger 
(2013; 2015). 
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for a rural resident to keep abreast of local 
land-use planning and issues by accessing 
information online than it would be to access 
county records in person. Stenberg et al. 
(2009), in their study of Internet usage in 
rural areas, cite several empirical studies 
finding that Internet use fosters civic 
engagement. While the path from Internet 
usage to outcomes of interest are not always 
clear, the data show that using broadband is 
positively correlated with higher levels of 
community involvement (Stern, Adams, & 
Boase, 2011). Stern and Adams (2010) 
suggest that better communication 
technologies (such as mobile broadband) 
lead to wider social circles and new ways to 
find information about civic participation. 
Such formation of “social capital” is most 
important in rural communities, where 
residents rely relatively more than in urban 
areas on local relationships with others to 
achieve personal and community goals. More 
recently, mobile broadband has been found 
to have a positive effect on digital citizenship, 
the engagement in online political and 
economic activities (Mossberger, Tolbert, 
and Anderson, 2014). 
Broadband can also have a vital role to play 
in rural telework (Stenberg et al., 2009, 
Morris and Goodridge, 2008). Many 
American businesses engage in global 
outsourcing for service support, yet 
customers are often dissatisfied with services 
outsourced to foreign countries. Couple 
these facts with survey results showing that 
almost two-fifths of rural residents are 
interested in working from home and would 
be open to telework. Finally, note that about 
three-fourths of businesses which outsource 
are interested in bringing some of those 
positions back to the United States if rural 
employees could fill the roles. For most such 
positions to be feasible, quality broadband 
connections would be required. Other, 
specifically mobile telework requires local 
rural employees in all cases. Examples here 
include sales and support staff of firms 
dealing with agribusiness. Of course, telework 
creates other benefits besides employment, 
including environmental benefits from 
decreased vehicular travel and reduced 
overhead and rents for employers 
(Economist, 2008). 
Telemedicine is another beneficial service 
enabled by broadband in rural areas. 
Telemedicine gives rural communities access 
to some of the same health care 
infrastructure that urban areas enjoy. In one 
of the few empirical studies on the benefits of 
telemedicine, a case study of five rural 
communities in Oklahoma were found to 
have saved $3.5M in healthcare cost for 
teleradiology and telepsychiatry (Whitacre et 
al., 2009). Some of the economic benefits of 
telemedicine include reductions in 
transportation cost and improved 
productivity for rural residents, increased 
work for local medical labs and pharmacies, 
and cost savings to rural hospitals from 
outsourcing procedures via telemedicine.  
Mobile broadband networks can play 
particularly important roles in telemedicine. 
One comprehensive review of economic 
analyses of heart failure monitoring systems 
found that all the studies concluded that 
telemonitoring was less expensive than usual 
care in a hospital, with a range of 2-68% cost 
savings, even before accounting for additional 
factors such as travel costs and a lower 
incidence of rehospitalization (Seto, 2008). 
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More and more e-health technology will rely 
on high-speed wireless networks, turning e-
health into m-health. Some m-health 
applications such as downloading diagnostic 
data and lab results to smartphones are 
feasible today, as long as mobile broadband 
coverage is available in the area. Other m-
health applications are just coming over the 
horizon of cost-effectiveness, such as 
personal networks of implanted or wearable 
body sensors. Since rural areas are more 
likely to be underserved by local healthcare 
facilities, leading to subpar healthcare 
(AHRQ, 2015), medical technology that 
allows remote monitoring or otherwise 
removes the limitations of distance in 
healthcare may greatly benefit rural 
communities. 
B. The economic cost of discouraging 
investment 
As discussed above, the total economic 
effects resulting from investment in mobile 
broadband are greater than the direct 
expenditure necessary to deploy the network. 
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) defines two types of spending 
multipliers (BEA, 2013). Type I multipliers 
account for the direct and indirect impacts of 
an increase in final demand (the wireless 
capex, in this case). The direct impact 
includes all the inputs purchased by the final-
demand industry: communications 
equipment, construction, etc. However, those 
inputs themselves came from supporting 
upstream industries, and creating the inputs 
required additional purchases by those 
industries. Thus the capex expenditure in the 
ultimate industry results in further rounds of 
new spending8F9 as the inputs used by the 
industries are linked to the outputs of the 
supplying industries. The sum of the direct 
and indirect impacts—the interindustry 
effect—composes the Type I multiplier. Type 
II multipliers add the induced impact of an 
increase in final demand to the interindustry 
effect. The induced impact arises from the 
additional household spending of workers 
whose earnings are affected by the investment 
and who spend that additional income in 
turn. The BEA calculates multipliers for 
regions, industries, and commodities based 
on regional input-output tables of the flow of 
goods and services in the economy. 
The multipliers from BEA provide useful 
estimates of ratios of total changes to initial 
changes in spending on investment goods. 
However, it is important to understand on 
what the figures rely. The calculations assume 
there are no changes in commodity or labor 
prices resulting from the increase in 
investment. The estimates thus stop short of 
being a full macroeconomic multiplier, which 
would incorporate Type I and Type II 
impacts along with a host of other behavioral 
responses of consumers and firms to the 
investment spending. However, when there is 
slack in the economy (as has been generally 
true since the last recession), input-output 
multipliers and complete macroeconomic 
multipliers are more likely to be similar 
(BEA, 2013). The BEA multipliers provide a 
useful starting point to assess the initial and 
not-too-distant indirect effects of investment. 
Quantification of other indirect impacts, such 
                                                 
9 The spending diminishes as it moves upstream from 
the originating industry because leakages occur 
through saving or spending outside the US economy. 
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as changes in the prices of investment goods 
due to increased demand or—even more 
distantly—changed prospects for employment 
due to the increased labor productivity, 
outsourcing, or e- and m-commerce that 
greater diffusion of broadband networks can 
(eventually) entail, would be highly 
speculative at best and is not pursued here. 
The multipliers available to convert dollars of 
investment spending to dollars of total 
economic outcomes include those for output 
(sales), value added (GDP), and earnings. 
The output multiplier is the ratio of the total 
change in sales to the change in local output 
purchased by final users. Whereas the output 
multiplier is for gross sales, the value-added 
multiplier measures the total change in value 
added per dollar of investment. Hence, the 
value-added multiplier is comparable to 
increases in GDP. Since sales inevitably 
involve double-counting as commodities are 
passed up and down the supply chain, the 
GDP multiplier is smaller than the output 
multiplier. The earnings multiplier measures 
the increase in earnings per dollar of local 
output purchased through investment.9F10 
Similarly, the total employment change 
throughout the economy resulting from 
investment in mobile broadband is greater 
than the labor directly employed to design 
and construct the network. Employment 
multipliers estimate how investment spending 
translates into additional employment.10F11  
                                                 
10 Earnings include all additional wages, salaries, 
proprietors’ income, and employer contributions for 
health insurance. Proprietors’ income includes the net 
earnings of sole-proprietors and partnerships. 
11 The resulting number of jobs created may not all be 
full-time positions, since the employment data the 
BEA uses to analyze the employment requirements of 
Similar analyses using BEA multipliers to 
estimate the economic impacts of broadband 
investment in the United States have been 
conducted by Katz and Suter (2009), 
Atkinson et al. (2009), Eisenach, Singer, and 
West (2009), Crandall and Singer (2010), 
and Sosa and Van Audenrode (2011). These 
previous studies typically used only the 
employment multipliers and in some cases 
also the output multipliers.11F12 
To make use of the multipliers, assumptions 
must be made as to how a dollar of wireless 
capex is spent. Previous studies made various 
assumptions but generally assume spending is 
split between wireless communications 
equipment and construction. Capital 
expenditure for purposes of investing in 
wireless infrastructure also includes 
expenditure on other items. Since backhaul 
is part of mobile broadband networks, and 
since backhaul often involves wired 
communications even when it is for wireless 
last-mile networks, another relevant 
commodity is fiber optic cable. Extending the 
capacity of wireless data coverage also 
requires deploying additional equipment on 
the backend, such as LTE equipment (i.e., 
the evolved packet core) and additional 
capacity in the wired network (routers, 
gateways, etc.) to handle the additional 
communications traffic. Finally, engineering 
services are required to design and 
implement the new network infrastructure 
                                                                         
the affected industries do not enumerate jobs in full-
time equivalents (BEA, 2013). 
12 In some cases in the literature the output multiplier 
has been mischaracterized as a GDP multiplier. 
However, the value-added multiplier must be used to 
determine impacts on GDP (Bess and Ambargis, 
2011, p.14). Gross output counts goods and services 
multiple times if they are used in the production of 
other goods and services. 
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and architecture. Depending on the 
breakdown of how an investment dollar is 
allocated to these items, the final multipliers 
can be calculated as weighted averages of the 
individual multipliers for the industries 
producing these commodities.12F13  
For purposes of the present analysis, three 
sets of assumptions on the breakdown of 
wireless capex are made. In the most detailed 
scenario, it is assumed that capex is spent on 
the complete range of items from radio 
equipment on the towers to the additional 
equipment needed to upgrade the backend 
and wired network to handle the increased 
traffic, as well as on construction and 
engineering services for network design. The 
exact percentages of—and the rationale for—
the capex breakdown are in the appendix. 
For comparison, two starkly different sets of 
assumptions are also employed for 
comparison. The first adopts the 
assumptions of Sosa and Van Audenrode 
(2011) that capex goes to wireless 
communications equipment in proportion to 
industry figures for capex and the rest to 
construction.13F14 Their method applied to the 
latest data results in the assumptions that 31% 
of wireless capex is spent on wireless 
equipment and 69% on construction.14F15 The 
other approach adopts the assumptions of 
Crandall and Singer (2010) and Eisenach et 
al. (2009) that 7% of spending is on 
                                                 
13 The particular commodities/industries are detailed 
in the appendix. 
14 That is, they calculate wireless communications 
capex in the United States as a fraction of total capex, 
and assume that an additional capex dollar will spend 
on wireless equipment in the same proportion. 
15 Sosa and Van Audenrode (2011) arrived at the 
figures of 44% for equipment and 56% for 
construction with their earlier years of capex data. 
construction and the rest is on wireless 
communications equipment.15F16 
The resulting multipliers for capex were 
computed from the BEA Regional Input-
Output Modeling System (RIMS II), where 
the region of analysis was the mainland 
United States and the latest version of the 
data available are used (the 2007 benchmark 
input-output table for the nation and 2013 
regional data). Since the input-output tables 
pertain to purchases of domestic goods, the 
multipliers must be adjusted downward to 
account for imports of some of the 
manufactured wireless communications and 
other equipment.16F17  
The results for the main assumptions, shown 
in Table 1, indicate that every dollar spent on 
wireless capex creates $1.2 of output across 
the domestic economy when accounting only 
for direct and indirect effects (the Type I 
effects). After including the induced effects of 
additional household spending, the increase 
in output rises to $2.1 (the Type II 
multiplier). The increment to GDP (from the 
value-added multiplier) is $0.7 for the Type I 
multiplier,17F18 but rises to $1.1 per dollar of 
                                                 
16 Discussion with an industry economist suggested that 
assuming such a small portion of capex going to 
construction is unrealistic. Nevertheless, the figures 
derived from this assumption are presented for 
continuity with and comparison to those previous 
studies. 
17 Details of the adjustment are in the appendix. Since 
the previous studies appear not to have adjusted their 
figures for import leakages, the multipliers in Table 1 
appear to be more modest than those in some of the 
previous studies. 
18 Type I value-added multipliers are always less than 
one by the nature of the input-output tables 
constructed by the BEA. Only a dollar was ultimately 
spent and the value-added methodology does not 
double count any expenditure as outputs from one 
industry are used as inputs in another. Total value 
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capex once the induced effects are included. 
The additional economic activity from a 
dollar of capex leads to $0.4 of additional 
household earnings for workers from direct 
and indirect effects, and a Type II multiplier 
of 0.7. Every million dollars spent in capex 
creates 7.5 jobs in America from the Type I 
multiplier, rising to 14.0 jobs per million 
spent from the Type II multiplier. 
 The economic impacts for output, value 
added, and household earnings are not very 
sensitive to whether the main or the first 
alternate assumptions are used; the results 
from the alternate assumptions are quite 
similar. The second set of alternate 
assumptions lead to much smaller multipliers 
for each type of impact considered. The large 
differences with the main set of assumptions 
arises because nearly all the money is spent 
on wireless equipment under these 
assumptions, and a large amount of such 
equipment is imported. Larger differences 
among the results appear for the employment 
                                                                         
added sums to less than one because of imports and 
other leakages. 
estimates. The Type II multiplier for 
employment is 14.0 with the main 
assumptions but ranges from 6.1 to 17.4 with 
the alternate assumptions.18F19  
These multipliers for mobile broadband 
investment are also the economic 
opportunity costs when such investment does 
not take place. Thus, each dollar not invested 
can pull more than a dollar out of the 
economy, whether measured by sales or 
GDP, reduces earnings, and prevent jobs 
from being created. The total scale of the 
opportunity costs created by current policy 
toward mobile data roaming is estimated in 
section III.B.3 below. 
                                                 
19 The larger variance among the outcomes arises 
because construction is highly labor intensive (at least 
compared to the equipment manufacturing industries 
used in the calculations) and the proportion of 
spending going toward construction varies greatly 
among the alternate assumptions. 
Table 1: Final Demand Multipliers for Mobile Broadband Investment 
  Main  
Assumptions 
Alternate 
Assumptions 1 
Alternate 
Assumptions 2 
 
Multiplier 
Unit 
note Type I Type II Type I Type II Type I Type II 
Output (1) 1.2 2.1 1.3 2.3 0.6 1.0 
Value added (1) 0.7 1.1 0.7 1.3 0.4 0.6 
Earnings (1) 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.3 
Employment (2) 7.5 14.0 9.6 17.4 3.2 6.1 
Unit notes: (1) Total dollars per dollar of capex. (2) Jobs per million dollars of capex. 
Table notes: Type I effects include direct and indirect effects of investment spending. Type II effects include, in addition, the 
induced impacts from the additional household spending of workers with increased earnings. See the appendix for the 
methodology. 
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III. Analysis of the poor incentives 
to invest fostered by current policy 
This section discusses the disincentives 
created by access regulation in general (in 
part A) and mobile data roaming in particular 
(Part B). The section concludes with a 
quantification of the economic harm caused 
by policy toward mobile data roaming. 
A. Telecommunications policy and 
investment 
Infrastructure investment is highly sensitive to 
changes in telecommunications policy and 
uncertainty about how committed regulators 
are to the status quo. Economic investment 
depends crucially on an expectation of a 
healthy return on the capital expenditure. 
Regulators cannot take continued investment 
and the robust health of the 
telecommunications infrastructure for 
granted. The basic economic theory behind 
the proposition is straightforward. Businesses 
undertake investment activity only if they 
expect to earn a rate of return high enough to 
cover the risks involved and other 
opportunity costs of capital. Some potential 
investment projects will be near the break-
even point, so that even small adverse 
changes in risk or other costs can make them 
unprofitable. Regulatory policy that raises 
investment or innovation costs, lowers 
revenue or pushes it farther into the future, 
or increases business risk will push these 
marginally profitable potential projects into 
the red, so that businesses will not pursue 
these opportunities. While the resulting 
social cost of such misguided regulation does 
not show up in any accountant’s ledger, the 
negative impact on consumers and firms is 
nonetheless real. 
A sizeable literature by economists and 
others documents how communications 
investment and innovation can be choked off 
by poor policy (Prieger and Heil, 2008; 
Cambini and Jiang, 2009). In the review of 
the literature here, only peer-reviewed 
research published in academic books and 
journals is included, to exclude industry-
sponsored research that may not have 
survived peer review. One analysis examined 
the rate at which new communications 
services were introduced by regulated firms 
during a period when the FCC experimented 
with lighter regulation. The study found that 
the number of services created during the 
period of lighter regulation was 60-99 percent 
higher than the model predicted if stricter 
regulation had remained in place (Prieger, 
2002). A similar study examining state-level 
data found that when lighter-touch state 
regulation was applied the incumbent 
telecommunications company in Indiana in 
the 1990s, it created new services 2 to 4.5 
times faster than it did under a previous, 
more-restrictive regime (Prieger, 2001). 
Other studies compare regulatory regimes to 
quantify how regulatory stringency dampens 
investment and innovation in 
telecommunications. Ai and Sappington 
(2002) show that state regulatory regimes in 
the United States that allowed 
telecommunications providers more leeway 
in setting their prices induced investment in 
process innovation that lowered operating 
costs. Prieger (2007) demonstrates 
empirically that shorter regulatory delay in 
offering new telecommunications services 
leads to quicker product innovation; in other 
words, there is a “delay multiplier” effect 
from poor regulation. Another strand of the 
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literature focuses specifically on broadband. 
Assessing the impact of differences in state 
regulation, Prieger and Lee (2008) find that 
the evidence is consistent with stricter 
regulation (rate of return regulation, in this 
case) dampening the incentive to deploy 
broadband infrastructure and service, 
compared to alternative, lighter-touch 
regulation. 
More recent literature addresses the impact 
of liberal policies toward service-based 
competition—i.e., access regulation—instead 
of encouraging and relying on infrastructure-
based competition. One recent study 
summarizes the current state of knowledge: 
“the majority of the empirical literature 
suggests that infrastructure-based competition 
has a positive impact on both investment and 
penetration. In turn, the evidence regarding 
service-based competition relying on 
broadband access regulations tends to be 
negatively related to investment activities….” 
(Briglauer, 2014, p.54, emphasis added). 
Whether studies examine broadband 
deployment in the United States (Jung et al., 
2008) or Europe (Hausman & Sidak, 2005; 
Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009; Grajek & 
Röller, 2012; Briglauer, Ecker, & Gugler, 
2013), they find that mandated access 
regulation (of which mobile data roaming is 
an example) leads to lower investment in and 
less deployment of next-generation networks. 
As one of these studies concludes: 
“promoting market entry by means of 
regulated access undermines incentives to 
invest in facilities-based competition” (Grajek 
& Röller, 2012, p.189). Given the many 
sources of data, varying methodology, and 
competing interests motivating the research, 
not every study comes to the same 
conclusion. However, as a comprehensive 
survey of the empirical literature concluded, 
“…most of the evidence shows that local loop 
unbundling based on forward-looking cost 
methodology discourages both ILECs and 
CLECs from investing in networks” (Cambini 
& Jiang, 2009). 
Mandating access to facilities deployed by 
rivals also has been shown by some studies to 
be less effective than facilities-based 
competition at encouraging broadband 
adoption by consumers, or to discourage it 
outright. Again, some studies look at 
America (Denni and Gruber, 2007) while 
others cover Europe (Cava-Ferreruela and 
Albau-Munoz, 2006; Distaso, Lupi, and 
Manenti, 2006; Höffler, 2007; Bouckaert et 
al., 2010). There is less unanimity in the 
literature regarding the impact of access 
regulation on broadband diffusion than on 
investment. Yet, in general, the findings from 
these studies are that infrastructure-based 
competition has a significant positive impact 
on broadband penetration, while access 
regulation and unbundling is less important 
or has no effect—or even a negative effect—on 
the spread of broadband Internet access.  
To think about why access regulation may 
hinder broadband adoption, consider the 
case of mobile roaming. When a carrier 
relies on roaming to serve customers in a 
rural area, it is unlikely to sign customers 
onto its network who live in that area.19F20 Thus 
consumers there will not enjoy the benefits of 
the added competition—lower prices, higher 
network quality, etc.—that facilities-based 
                                                 
20 Instead, the roaming will be for the convenience of 
its subscribers in other areas in which it has its own 
network coverage, for when they roam outside their 
home areas. 
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entry would entail, and some of them may 
find the value proposition unattractive 
enough to stay off the network. 
Proponents of access regulation often justify 
it based on the so-called “stepping-stone” or 
“ladder-of-investment” (LOI) theory. The 
LOI approach claims that service-based 
competition (when entrants lease access to 
incumbents’ facilities) serves as the bottom 
rungs of a ladder ascending to facility-based 
entry. The theory may be attractive to 
regulators trying to stimulate competition in 
markets by artificially creating competitors 
who have not entered the market in the 
traditional sense by investing in their own 
infrastructure. Notwithstanding the appeal, 
there is little empirical support for LOI 
theory. Most of the empirical work draws on 
data from Europe, where 
telecommunications regulators have explicitly 
adopted the LOI framework. Bacache, 
Bourreau, and Gaudin (2014) show in a 
careful econometric study of the European 
experience that there is no empirical support 
for the LOI hypothesis. Firms entering only 
by means of mandated access to rivals’ 
network did not transition toward 
infrastructure-based competition. 
B. Policy toward data roaming in the 
United States 
1. Public policy regarding roaming 
Roaming in the mobile communications 
industry refers to the process by which one 
wireless provider uses another provider’s 
network to serve its customers. Roaming 
allows a carrier’s customers to travel out of its 
home territory (the areas it has deployed its 
network) but still be able to complete mobile 
calls and enjoy broadband access. Roaming 
has been around for as long as the mobile 
voice industry, and at first relied on private 
contractual arrangements between carriers. 
The FCC first established rules in favor of 
roaming in 2007 for voice communication, 
requiring host providers to “automatically” 
allow access to any carrier agreeing to 
reasonable terms and conditions ( FCC, 
2015b). In 2010, the FCC eliminated the 
home market rule, which had stipulated that 
if a provider owned spectrum covering an 
area it could not demand roaming from other 
providers there. The sound economic logic 
behind the home market rule was that the 
option to rely on roaming should not serve to 
discourage facilities-based network 
competition, when the spectrum is licensed 
and readily available for use. 
In April 2011, the FCC issued its first set of 
rules specifically for mobile data roaming 
(FCC, 2011a). Under these rules, the 
obligation of a host provider to automatically 
allow roaming on its network was extended to 
data service. The rules require facilities-based 
service providers of mobile broadband to 
offer data roaming arrangements to other 
providers on “commercially reasonable terms 
and conditions.” In its order, the FCC 
concluded that the data roaming rules would 
“promote consumer access to seamless 
mobile data coverage nationwide, 
appropriately balance the incentives for new 
entrants and incumbent providers to invest in 
and deploy advanced networks across the 
country, and foster competition among 
multiple providers in the industry….” (FCC, 
2011a, at 13). In other words, the FCC relied 
upon the ladder of investment (LOI) theory 
to justify its access regulation, despite the 
empirical literature reviewed above either 
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questioning whether it leads to those rosy 
outcomes or demonstrating that it does not. 
In May 2014, T-Mobile USA petitioned the 
FCC to provide guidance on what 
“commercially reasonable” should mean in 
practice and on what role the extent of build-
out should play in the determination. In 
December 2014, the FCC granted three 
specific requests made by T-Mobile in its 
Declaratory Ruling (FCC, 2014b). While the 
details are complex, the general result of the 
new rules is that mobile data roaming 
becomes cheaper and easier for requesting 
providers. First, the FCC set forth several 
benchmarks by which to assess whether 
proposed data roaming rates are reasonable: 
retail rates, international roaming rates, 
MVNO/resale rates, and other domestic 
roaming rates (despite the fact that the 
technology, geography, and other cost factors 
underlying these other rates may have been 
completely different), any or all of which may 
be considered on a per-case basis. Second, 
the FCC removed the presumption that a 
past data roaming agreement is reasonable 
when negotiating the next agreement. Third, 
the host provider was disallowed from 
denying roaming services to a requesting 
provider on the basis that the otherwise built-
out requesting provider had not built out in 
the particular area at issue.  
AT&T and Verizon have filed petitions with 
the FCC contesting the new interpretations of 
the original data roaming order; the FCC is 
currently considering those requests that its 
latest guidelines be reviewed (Goldstein, 
2015). Some of the carriers’ objections are 
procedural in nature, arguing that the FCC 
effectively changed regulations without an 
actual proceeding for a rulemaking. Another 
objection made is that by recasting the test for 
commercial reasonableness as something to 
be determined by the FCC on a case-by-case 
basis, the regulator has imposed a vague 
standard—actually, a non-standard—leading to 
unpredictable outcomes. Vagueness can lead 
to arbitrary decisions regarding the terms and 
rates for roaming agreements; as discussed 
above uncertainty of outcomes is likely to 
discourage investment on both sides.20F21 The 
main economic concern is related to the 
theory and empirical evidence regarding 
access regulation discussed above: allowing 
roaming discourages mobile service providers 
to expand their own coverage and invest in 
building out wireless infrastructure. 
2. Negative consequences of the 
policy in general  
The review of the literature above indicated 
that access regulation in general leads to the 
(entirely predictable) consequence that 
facilities-based competition and investment is 
retarded. With specific reference to data 
roaming, it is easy to see the perverse 
incentives the current rules provide. Allowing 
non-investing carriers to interconnect their 
mobile data customers in rural areas to their 
rivals’ networks at advantaged rates throws 
water on the fire to deploy their own 
infrastructure. Consumers lose out on at least 
two benefits. First, research by Prieger, 
Molnar, and Savage (2014) shows that 
competition using facilities-based 
                                                 
21 Economic theory—as well as common business 
sense—has long made it clear that regulatory 
uncertainty prevents or delays private investment. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show formally how 
uncertainty creates an option value for the would-be 
investor to wait until the uncertainty is lessened or 
resolved. Teisberg (1993) shows that firms invest less 
and delay investment when faced with uncertain 
outcomes created by regulation. 
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infrastructure spurs providers to improve the 
speed of broadband. While their results were 
estimated using data from the wired 
broadband market, the same principle can 
apply to wireless. Clearly a data roaming 
provider cannot offer higher speeds to its 
subscribers if it is not deploying the 
infrastructure to do so. Without this 
competitive impetus, the host roaming 
provider also misses out on the additional 
incentive to upgrade its facilities. 
Furthermore, despite the spectrum crunch, 
licensed bandwidth lies fallow, since the 
roaming carrier typically uses (and therefore 
congests) the host provider’s spectrum, not its 
own.21F22 
Second, reliance on data roaming for rural 
areas in many cases will not expand 
competitive options for rural residents. If a 
person lives in an area covered by a spectrum 
license held by a provider which has not built 
out in that area, it is unlikely that the provider 
would allow the user to sign up for mobile 
broadband service. Instead, the data roaming 
is typically offered instead as a convenience 
to subscribers from other (more urbanized) 
areas who are traveling. For example, as 
noted by AT&T (Marsh, 2014), T-Mobile 
holds spectrum licenses covering the United 
States but does not in fact (based on its 
coverage maps from the time) offer service in 
many rural areas in the Midwest, Mountain, 
and certain Eastern portions of the U.S. In a 
separate analysis of the largely rural states of 
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming, Smith (2015) finds 
                                                 
22 in the case of Sprint and T-Mobile, the companies 
nearly always holds licensed spectrum in the areas it 
instead relies upon roaming, as discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
that Sprint and T-Mobile hold spectrum 
licenses in each county in each state, but 
provide neither voice nor data service in 77% 
of those counties. In contrast, AT&T and 
Verizon, the main host roaming providers in 
those states, each offer mobile voice and data 
service in almost all counties.22F23 
Under the 2014 Declaratory Ruling, the host 
provider is not allowed to denying data 
roaming services to a competitor on the basis 
that the requesting provider has not deployed 
its own infrastructure in the area even when it 
has built out in other areas. Through its 
decision, the FCC in essence gives non-
investing mobile broadband providers license 
to ignore at least the intent of the buildout 
requirements inherent in the ownership of 
spectrum licenses. The purposes of the 
buildout requirements are to encourage 
licensees to provide facilities-based service in 
a timely manner, to prevent the 
“warehousing” of spectrum (obtaining 
licenses merely to prevent rivals from having 
it), to promote the provision of innovative 
services throughout the license areas, and to 
encourage provision of service in rural areas 
(GAO, 2014).  
The letter of the law regarding the buildout 
requirements for spectrum holdings is quite 
involved, and varies by type of license (the 
geography, spectrum band, and wireless 
services authorized). The requirements 
themselves vary with regard to how buildout 
is measured (e.g., fraction of population or 
area), whether there is just one or multiple 
                                                 
23 AT&T and Verizon offer mobile data coverage in at 
least parts of more than 99.5% of the counties in these 
five states (although not every part of every county is 
covered in some cases). Refer to the coverage maps 
and Appendix A in Smith (2015). 
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milestones for coverage to be met, and how 
much time after acquisition of the license is 
granted to meet the goals.23F24 Given the 
complexity of the requirements and the fact 
that virtually the only entity that could verify 
whether they are met is the license holder 
itself—which is why the FCC relies on self-
certification to “enforce” buildout 
requirements for wireless services—it is 
beyond the scope of this report to assess 
whether buildout in any particular area has 
been met. The spirit of the rules, however, is 
clear from the goals: to provide service and 
an expanded set of competitive choices to 
consumers, especially in rural areas, in a 
timely manner.24F25 
Thus, an obligation to offer data roaming 
“automatically” to rivals provides clear 
disincentives to invest in network-based 
competition. There is even some evidence 
that roaming has spurred some disinvestment 
in the past. In some cases Sprint has told 
subscribers in particular areas that it was 
switching to roaming when it had formerly 
provided coverage using its own network.25F26 
                                                 
24 Refer to GAO, 2014, for an explication and review 
of the FCC’s build-out requirements. 
25 The FCC had an interesting notion to offer in 
(oblique) response to such criticisms. In the 
Declaratory Ruling, the FCC (2014b) stated that is 
some areas “it is uneconomical for several providers to 
buildout.” The obvious question one then must ask is: 
why did they sell multiple spectrum licenses for such 
areas? The rationale for selling multiple licenses in 
each area was, on the one hand, that technology and 
the scale of consumer demand had changed drastically 
enough since the 1980s that wireless communications 
was no longer a natural monopoly or duopoly in which 
provision by only one or two providers was most 
efficient. On the other hand, multiple licenses were 
offered in recognition of the benefits to consumers of 
vigorous facilities-based competition among providers. 
26 Quinn (2012a,b) documents (from Sprint’s 
announcements and coverage maps provided to 
3. An estimate of the scale of the 
negative economic impacts 
In the United States today, there are four 
major, national providers of mobile 
broadband service: AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, 
and Verizon. Each holds spectrum licenses to 
offer mobile wireless voice and data services 
in almost all parts of the country. However, 
only two of those providers, AT&T and 
Verizon, have both committed to and 
achieved deploying the infrastructure needed 
to serve latest-generation mobile broadband 
to most of rural America. The latest report 
from the FCC on the mobile 
communications market shows that the LTE 
networks for mobile broadband of AT&T 
and Verizon cover 85% and 92%, 
respectively, of rural population in the 
United States. On the other hand, Sprint and 
T-Mobile each cover less than half of the 
rural population with their LTE networks. 
The stark differences in rural coverage are 
shown in Figure 1.26F27 
Building infrastructure in rural areas requires 
large investments. Figure 2 shows the wireless 
capex in recent years of the four national 
mobile broadband providers.27F28 AT&T and 
                                                                         
customers) one such episode in Kansas and 
Oklahoma in 2012, which Sprint openly described as 
a “cost-cutting measure.” Sprint also told investors that 
reliance on roaming instead of deploying 
infrastructure had led the company to spend $15 
billion less in capex from 2008 to 2011 than it 
otherwise would have (Sprint Nextel [2012], quoted 
and discussed in Quinn [2012c]). 
27 Note that the FCC states that their calculations likely 
result in an overstatement of the extent of mobile 
wireless coverage. 
28 An industry economist pointed out that these 
wireless capex figures underestimate the true 
deployment costs of mobile broadband, since wireless 
communications often depends on wired backhaul. 
However, backhaul fees paid to wireline appear as 
 18 
 
Verizon have invested more than twice as 
much as Sprint and T-Mobile since 2011.28F29 
Of course, not all capex during these years 
went to rural broadband; providers were also 
adding bandwidth and improving facilities in 
urban areas as well. However, much did go 
toward building out in less urban and rural 
areas. Since 2012, AT&T has more than 
doubled its LTE broadband coverage (in 
terms of population covered), from 150 
million people covered in November 2012 to 
over 300 million covered today (FCC, 2013, 
2015b). Verizon increased its LTE 
broadband coverage from 200 million people 
                                                                         
operating expenses for the wireless carrier or division, 
not capex. 
29 AT&T and Verizon invested $101.6B in wireless 
capex during these years, while Sprint and T-Mobile 
USA invested $43.1B. The former figure is 136% 
more than the latter figure. 
covered in November 2012 to over 300 
million today. Both AT&T and Verizon now 
cover about 97% of the total population in 
the nation as of July 2015, per analysis by the 
FCC (2015b). Sprint and T-Mobile, while 
improving their LTE coverage over the years, 
still do not offer the latest generation of 
mobile broadband to 15% of Americans, 
mostly in rural areas.29F30 
Without the data roaming rules, either in the 
original form from the 2011 Order or the 
modified form from the 2014 Declaratory 
                                                 
30 The   FCC (2015b) calculates that AT&T covers 
302.1 million of the 312.5 million people in the nation 
with its LTE mobile broadband network, and that 
Verizon covers 303.2 million. Sprint covers 265.6 
million and T-Mobile covers 266.2 million people, 
although it is unclear from the FCC report whether 
those figures include the LTE roaming areas of the 
two carriers. 
Figure 1: Estimated Mobile LTE Coverage in Rural Areas by Service Provider, July 2015 
 
Source:  FCC, 2015b. 
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Ruling, what would investment look like for 
Sprint and T-Mobile? Analyzing a 
counterfactual is always difficult, because—by 
definition—the object of study is not observed 
directly. And, while economists in the field of 
industrial organization have made great 
econometric strides in recent decades toward 
estimating an industry’s response to 
counterfactual situations, the detailed data 
needed for such techniques are unavailable 
here. Therefore instead of performing a 
formal econometric analysis, a more 
informal—yet still illuminating—procedure is 
adopted here.  
If Sprint and T-Mobile could not rely on data 
roaming to extend their coverage areas, or 
could only do so for a brief time while they 
deployed their own infrastructure, then to 
offer LTE coverage comparable to AT&T 
and Verizon they would each have to have 
covered about 37 million additional people 
with their networks as of midyear 2015.30F31 The 
bulk of these people without coverage—24 
million of them—are in rural areas. To be 
conservative, only these rural Americans not 
covered by Sprint and T-Mobile will be 
included in the analysis.  
How much investment would it have taken to 
cover these additional people? Wireless 
broadband deployment costs per head 
covered vary hugely in the estimates of 
academics, industry, and business analysts. At 
the extreme low end, one source in the trade 
press refers to figures purportedly from a 
major carrier indicating that it would cost $69 
per head covered to push mobile broadband 
                                                 
31 This figure is based on the LTE coverage figures in 
the previous footnote. 
Figure 2: Wireless Capital Expenditure by Major Providers, 2011-2015 
 
Note: Data for AT&T and Sprint for 2015 are estimated. Sources:   FCC (2015b), Verizon Communications (2016), Raymond 
James Financial (Louthan, 2015), Skyline Marketing Group (Celentano, 2015), and T-Mobile US (2016). 
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out to 55 million rural inhabitants.31F32 This 
figure would be for a “brownfield” 
deployment of LTE where previous 
generation mobile networks are already 
deployed. Bazelon (2010) estimates that the 
capex required for greenfield fixed wireless 
broadband for a particular rural county is 
$219 per household,32F33 which would be about 
$85 per person. Fixed wireless costs are 
typically lower than mobile broadband costs, 
due to the lower spectral efficiency expected 
with mobile communications. Other sources 
for remote rural areas with difficult terrain 
and extremely sparse population arrive at 
coverage costs around $1,000 per 
subscriber.33F34  
For another source of mobile wireless 
deployment costs, consider the reverse 
auctions the FCC conducted for the Connect 
America Mobility Fund.34F35 In these auctions, 
                                                 
32 See RWA (2011). The organization claims that in a 
temporarily unredacted filing to the FCC, AT&T 
stated that incremental rural LTE deployment could 
be extended to 55 million mostly rural Americans for 
$3.8 billion. Dividing the latter figure by the former 
yields $69.09 per head. Neither the claim nor the 
context of the statements can be verified at the present 
time.  
33 This figure excludes cost for the spectrum license. 
34 One cost estimate for a small (120 subscriber) rural 
cell site came to a total of $107,000 for the tower site, 
necessary studies, equipment, and backhaul (Yurok 
Tribe Information Services Department, 2011). Those 
figures amount to about $890 per subscriber. Another 
study for fixed wireless broadband provision in 
Wyoming arrived at a figure of $1,243 up front capital 
cost per customer. Deployment of fixed wireless 
broadband is typically less expensive than mobile 
broadband, since the fixed equipment does not need 
to handle the complications that arise from mobility 
such as handoff between cell sites and impairment of 
mobile channels with interference, multipath, and 
blockage, all of which are highly spatially and 
temporally variable (Bergman, 2014).  
35 Details on Phase I of the Mobility Fund are in FCC 
(2011b), at 301-478.  
the FCC designated a set of unserved areas 
for bidding and providers bid on the 
minimum one-time support payment they 
would accept in exchange for deploying 3G 
(or better) mobile service to the area. If the 
auctions served as an effective information-
revelation device, the winning bids would be 
roughly the same as the deployment cost.35F36 
The distribution of the 483 winning bids for 
areas in the mainland U.S., expressed as 
dollars per population living in the area 
covered, is shown in Figure 3. The range of 
implied deployment cost per head is huge: 
the interquartile range stretches from $433 
per capita to $4,459. The median winning 
bid was $1,453 and the average was $1,381 
(both per capita.)  
Given the variety of figures presented here, 
reasonable and conservative estimates for the 
capital expenditure necessary to deploy LTE 
would appear to be in the range of roughly 
$100 to $1,400 per person.36F37 The analysis 
here proceeds by adopting a conservative 
figure near the low end of these estimates: 
$200 of capex required per person covered. 
As a final point of comparison, the $200 per 
                                                 
36 Auction theory suggests that bids would be the 
difference between the present value of the expected 
revenue stream on the one hand and the deployment 
cost plus the expected stream of operating costs on the 
other hand (or, more precisely, the winning bid would 
be a bit below the second-lowest such difference, with 
the carrier with the lowest such difference winning the 
auction). Assuming that mobile service would be 
priced high enough to cover operating costs in these 
areas, the difference reduces to the deployment cost. 
The bids were placed in 2012 and have not been 
adjusted for inflation here. 
37 The low end of the range comes from Bazelon’s 
fixed wireless deployment estimate of $85/head 
discussed above, marked up to account for the lower 
efficiency of mobile broadband and inflation since 
2010. The high end of this conservative range is 
around the mean and median of the Mobility Fund 
winning bids discussed in the text. 
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head assumed here is much less than the 
$413 per subscriber offered as high-cost 
support under the FCC’s Connect America 
Fund for areas unserved by broadband.37F38 
These figures imply that in a counterfactual 
world without Sprint and T-Mobile being 
                                                 
38 Phase II of the Connect America Fund employed an 
economic-engineering cost model to identify high-cost 
areas lacking competition. The total CAF II funding 
offered across the nation was about $1.5 billion to 
cover 3.6 million mostly rural homes and businesses. 
The implied $413 per subscriber includes operating 
expenditure and not just capex, but on the other hand 
it only includes a year’s worth of amortization of the 
capex. The number is also lowered compared to the 
other estimates of capex/head because 1) business 
locations are included in the denominator, 2) it is an 
amount to be offered as supplemental support, not the 
actual full yearly cost of providing service, and 3) it is 
for fixed broadband, not mobile. 
able to rely indefinitely on data roaming in 
rural areas, and in which the two providers 
take seriously the intent of their buildout 
obligation, there would have been an 
additional $9.6 billion in wireless investment 
in recent years.38F39 This amount is the total 
across both companies.39F40 Note that this 
                                                 
39 The figure is the result of multiplying $200 capex per 
head by 24 million people by two carriers: 200 × 24 
million × 2 = 9.6 billion.  
40 A possible objection to the calculations may be that 
if Sprint and T-Mobile had spent the additional $3.8 
billion to extend their rural coverage that they would 
have spent less in other areas. This appears to be 
unlikely. If it was profitable to undertake the other 
investment that actually occurred, the additional 
spending postulated here does not change that fact. 
Companies seek profitable investment projects and 
then raise funding for them (whether internally or by 
going to debt or equity markets); basic 
microeconomics teaches that unlike households, firms 
Figure 3: Support per Capita for Mobile Network Deployment Derived from the  
FCC Mobility Fund Auction 
 
Source: Data on population per area are from the Biddable Items list for Auction 901 
(wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/901/901_biddable_items_090712.xls); the winning bids are from the FCC Results page for Auction 901 
(auctionsignon.fcc.gov/signon/index.htm); the implied $/person are calculated by the author. The 483 bids are for areas in the 
mainland U.S. only. 
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amount of spending is still less than the 
difference in capex in any single year between 
these firms on the one hand and AT&T and 
Verizon on the other, as can be derived from 
Figure 2. The amount, while not small, 
appears to have been within the capabilities 
of the firms to have spent had they not been 
able to rely of roaming.40F41 
What impact did that forgone investment 
have on the economy? Multiplying the $9.6 
billion in forgone capex by the multipliers 
calculated in section II.B above yields the 
outcomes in Table 2. Under the main set of 
assumptions, the Type I effects show that the 
economy lost out on $11.7 billion in 
additional sales that would have added $6.4 
billion to GDP. Forgone earnings total $4.0 
billion, while about 71,500 new jobs would 
have been created but were not. Under the 
alternative assumptions described above, 
                                                                         
do not begin their economic decision-making with a 
budget constraint. 
41 It appears that spending an additional $9.6 billion in 
total would have been well within the capabilities of 
the firms. If Sprint would have spent the same 
proportion of capex to service revenue in 2010-2012 
that it did in 2013, it could have spent $10.5 billion 
more in those years—more than necessary to make up 
its half of the $9.6 billion in additional capex 
underlying the estimates above. Thus, based on 
Sprint’s 2013 level of capex, there is no indication that 
the additional investment amounts discussed here 
would have strained the company’s financial 
capacities. The same calculation for T-Mobile USA 
implies the company could have spent $2.8 billion 
more on capex during 2010–2012. This is less than 
the $4.8 billion making up T-Mobile’s half of the 
additional capex discussed here. However, if the 
additional amount were spread evenly among 2010–
2012, it would be a 55% to 59% increase over actual 
capex in those years. T-Mobile in fact raised its capex 
by 51% in 2013 over its average level from the 
previous three years, with no apparent financial strain 
on the company or degradation of its stock price. The 
capex and service revenue estimates used in these 
calculations come from FCC (2015b). 
additional output not created ranges from 
$6.2 billion to $12.6 billion and value-not-
added ranges from $3.5 billion to $7.0 
billion. The figures for earnings and 
employment have similarly broad ranges. 
However, even the low end of the estimates—
lost incremental earnings of $1.8 billion and 
about 30,500 jobs—are sizeable economic 
impacts on the labor market. The high end 
of the estimates includes incremental 
earnings of $4.8 billion prevented from 
entering the pockets of workers and about 
91,900 positions never created.  
The Type I economic effects stop short of 
tracing out all the impacts of the changes in 
the economy due to the spending since they 
do not include the induced effects from the 
additional household spending of workers. 
The Type II effects, included on the right 
side of Table 2, show that the forgone 
investment from reliance on data roaming led 
to much larger final economic impacts than 
the Type I effects capture. Under the main 
set of assumptions, the Type II effects 
indicate that if Sprint and T-Mobile would 
have spent the additional $9.6 billion in 
capex, there would have been $19.8 billion in 
additional sales in the American economy, 
adding $10.9 billion to GDP. Earnings would 
have increased by $6.4 billion, while about 
134,100 new jobs would have been created. 
Under the alternative assumptions, as much 
as $22.2 billion in additional sales would have 
ensued and as much as $12.4 billion of value 
would have been added to the economy. The 
low end of the estimates include $2.9 billion 
for additional earnings and 58,500 jobs, while 
the high-end estimates are incremental 
earnings of $7.6 billion and about 166,600 
new positions. All of this additional 
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economic activity would have been most 
welcome in the generally weak economy and 
labor market since the recent recession. 
The estimates here are meant to suggest the 
possible magnitude of the proximate 
economic consequences of lax policy toward 
mobile data roaming. The ultimate 
consequences for the economy may have 
been even larger, for two reasons. The 
estimates in Table 2 do not include “network 
effects”, which arise from the ways that 
business and consumer behavior and 
capabilities change due to mobile broadband 
infrastructure.41F42 As discussed above, as a 
general-purpose technology, mobile 
broadband infrastructure allows the 
transformation of existing industries and the 
creation of new technologies, firms, 
industries, and ways of using labor that would 
create extra value for the economy. Second, 
the calculations are based on expansion of 
Sprint and T-Mobile’s networks to cover 
                                                 
42 Atkinson et al. (2009) discuss such network effects in 
the general context of investment in digital 
infrastructure. 
additional rural Americans only. If these 
providers would have also expanded their 
network coverage in nonrural areas to match 
AT&T and Verizon, an additional 13 million 
Americans would have been covered in those 
regions. Even generously assuming that 
deployment of LTE in nonrural areas costs 
only $80 per head (only 40% of the assumed 
cost for rural areas), covering these additional 
people would increase all of the benefits 
from investment shown in Table 2 by 
between one-fifth and one-quarter.42F43 
                                                 
43 At $80/head instead of the assumed $200/head for 
rural coverage, there would have been $80 × 13 
million people × 2 carriers = $2.1 billion in additional 
wireless capex. This spending would add 22% to the 
$9.6 in capex calculated above for the rural areas, and 
all the figures in Table 2 would increase by 22%. 
Table 2: Economic Benefits Forgone Due to Reliance on  
Mobile Data Roaming Instead of Investment in Infrastructure  
 Type I Effects Type II Effects 
 
Final-Demand Multiplier 
Main 
Assumptions 
Alternative 
Assumptions 
Main 
Assumptions 
Alternative 
Assumptions 
Output ($B) 11.7 6.2 – 12.6 19.8 9.8 – 22.2 
Value added ($B) 6.4 3.5 – 7.0 10.9 5.6 – 12.4 
Earnings ($B) 4.0 1.8 – 4.8 6.4 2.9 – 7.6 
Employment (# jobs) 71,531 30,467 –  91,888 134,122 
58,454 – 
166,630 
Notes: Impacts are based on $9.6 billion additional investment in wireless capex. Type I effects include direct and indirect effects 
of investment spending. Type II effects include, in addition, the induced impacts from the additional household spending of 
workers with increased earnings. 
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Appendix 
This appendix contains some additional detail on 
the calculation of the multipliers and the final 
economic impacts discussed in the text.  
The main set of assumptions are as follows: 
1. In the breakdown of whither goes a dollar of 
capex, it is assumed that 31% of wireless 
capex is spent on wireless equipment. This 
figure is derived from the estimated share of 
wireless equipment spending to wireless 
capex for the wireless broadband industry, 
averaged over 2012-2015 (Credit Suisse, 
2014). 
2. For that wireless-specific part of the capex, 
70% of spending is for radio equipment, 15% 
is for backhaul, and 15% is for the LTE 
evolved packet core.43F44 These items are linked 
to data from BEA in the following manner: 
o Radio equipment is associated with 
BEA commodity 334220, Broadcast 
and wireless communications 
equipment. 
o Backhaul is associated with BEA 
commodity 335920, Communication 
and energy wire and cable 
manufacturing (for fiber optic).44F45 
                                                 
44 A wireless industry analyst is quoted in Mucci (2013) 
as saying that 70% of wireless capex is devoted to 
construction, installation, and equipment for the radio 
component of the network, while the rest goes to 
construction, installation, and equipment for the 
backhaul and LTE (i.e., evolved packet core). 
45 Two issues arise with backhaul. First, backhaul in the 
mobile wireless industry is often purchased from other 
providers. However, the FCC’s most recent industry 
report states that “the leading mobile wireless service 
providers have deployed or are in the process of 
deploying Ethernet backhaul either over fiber or 
microwave to their cell sites” ( FCC, 2015b at 70). In 
particular, “As of March 2015, of its 54,000 cell sites, 
T-Mobile already has fiber backhaul connections to 
50,000 sites” and “Sprint’s network modernization was 
substantially completed in 2014 which utilizes 
Ethernet for its backhaul and its LTE network covered 
o Evolved packet core expenditures are 
associated with BEA commodity 
334413, Semiconductor and related 
device manufacturing.45F46  
3. For every four dollars spent on the items in 
numbers 1 and 2 above, another dollar is 
spent on engineering services. This estimate 
appears to be conservative; the wireless 
industry as a whole spends a far greater share 
on NAICS category 541300, Architectural, 
engineering, and related services, than on 
equipment (but the industry requirements 
table mingles opex and capex). 
4. For every four dollars spent on the items in 
numbers 1-3 above for the wireless-specific 
part of the capex and associated engineering 
costs, another dollar is spent upgrading other 
parts of the wired network to handle the 
additional traffic. This dollar is spent on 
additional engineering services, fiber optic 
cable, and other equipment for the wired 
broadband network (associated to the same 
BEA commodities as in number 2 above). 
The proportions for these three items are the 
same as for the BEA direct requirements for 
the wireless communications industry. 
                                                                         
more than 280 million people as of May 2015” ( FCC, 
2015b at 70) 
46 Some of these expenditures may instead be 
associated with 334210, Telephone apparatus 
manufacturing, which (despite the old-fashioned 
sounding name) includes equipment such as routers. 
However, the industry spends far more on commodity 
334413 than on commodity 334210, per the BEA’s 
direct requirements table for the wireless 
communications industry. The 2007 Direct 
Requirements table shows that wireless 
telecommunications carriers (industry 517210) use 5.9 
cents worth of commodity 334413 (semiconductors) 
but only 0.6 cents worth of commodity 334210 
(telephone apparatus) to create a dollar’s worth of 
output. Thus, commodity 334413 is chosen. Given the 
minor differences in the multipliers for 
semiconductors and telephone apparatus, this decision 
does not affect the final results much. 
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5. The remainder of capex goes to construction. 
The relevant construction category in the 
BEA commodity/industry tables is 2332C0, 
Nonresidential structures, which includes 
category 233240, power and communication 
structures (among others). 
After establishing these assumptions, the next 
step toward calculating the multipliers is to 
determine for spending on manufactured goods 
how much of each dollar goes toward the 
manufacturer, how much goes to the wholesaler, 
and how much for transported the manufactured 
goods.46F47 These are known as the distribution 
costs for the manufactured commodities. 
Following the accepted methodology provided by 
BEA results in the following figures: 80% of 
spending on broadcast and wireless 
communications equipment goes to the 
manufacturer, 18% to the wholesale industry, and 
the trivial remainder goes to transportation. For 
communication and energy wire and cable 
manufactured goods, the similar breakdown is 
77% to the manufacturer, 22% to wholesale, and 
1% to transportation. The same three figures for 
semiconductor and related device manufactured 
goods are 82%, 16%, and 1% to the 
manufacturer, the wholesaler, and transporter, 
resp. 
Next, how much of spending on the 
manufactured items stays within the domestic 
economy is determined, versus leaking abroad 
through the purchase of imported goods. The 
fraction of domestically produced and delivered 
goods out of all purchases (domestic + imported) 
by industry is found from United States Census 
Bureau’s Manufacturing and International Trade 
Report: 2013 and 2012. Matching industries as 
closely as possible to the BEA categories, the 
following figures are used: 21% of commodity 
334220, 71% of commodity 335920, and 60% of 
commodity 334413 is domestically produced. 
                                                 
47 The BEA (2013) documentation on the use of the 
RIMS II multipliers describes this procedure.  
The rest of the spending (the part going to 
imported goods) disappears from the rest of the 
calculations.  
The result of these assumptions and procedures 
is the final breakdown of a dollar of wireless 
capex as shown in Table 3. The final column 
sums to less than 100% due to spending on 
imported goods. 
Table 3: Division of Total Wireless Capex  
into Its Constituent Domestic Parts 
 
Commodity/Industry 
Fraction of 
wireless 
capex 
Broadcast and wireless 
communications equipment 5.3% 
Communication and energy wire 
and cable manufacturing 4.0% 
Semiconductor and related 
device manufacturing 7.7% 
Architectural, engineering, and 
related services 15.5% 
Construction of Nonresidential 
structures 30.8% 
Transportation 0.7% 
Wholesale 9.7% 
Note: Figures sum to less than 100% due to leakage to 
imports. 
The Type I and Type II multipliers for each of 
the rows in the table above were obtained from 
the BEA RIMS II system, where the region of 
analysis was the contiguous United States. The 
2007 benchmark input-output table for the nation 
(to calculate linkages among industries) and 2013 
regional data (to calculate leakages outside the 
region) were used; these are the latest available 
data in RIMS. The multipliers are shown in 
Table 4 below. 
The final multiplier of each type is a weighted 
sum of the commodity-specific multipliers and 
the “Fraction of wireless capex” weights in the 
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previous table above. The final multipliers are 
given in Table 1 in the text. 
For the alternative assumptions, to hew to the 
methodology of the original authors from which 
the assumptions are taken, there are no 
adjustments for distribution costs (transportation 
and wholesaling). Otherwise the procedure to 
arrive at the final multipliers in Table 1 is the 
same as outlined above. In particular, this means 
that unlike some of the original authors, leakages 
to imports are still accounted for here.
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Table 4: Final Demand Multipliers for Mobile Broadband Investment 
BEA/  
NAICS Commodity 
Final-
demand 
Output 
(dollars) 
Final-
demand 
Earnings 
(dollars) 
Final-
demand 
Employment 
(number of 
jobs/$M) 
Final-
demand 
Value-added  
(dollars) 
  Type I Multipliers 
334220 Broadcast and wireless communications equipment 1.59 0.34 4.92 0.83 
335920 Communication and energy wire and cable manufacturing 2.24 0.42 7.30 0.70 
334413 Semiconductor and related device manufacturing 1.47 0.40 4.92 0.89 
541300 Architectural, engineering, and related services 1.73 0.65 11.13 0.93 
334210 Telephone apparatus manufacturing 1.69 0.41 5.54 0.84 
2332C0 Nonresidential structures 1.65 0.66 12.77 0.91 
484000 Truck transportation 1.85 0.55 11.40 0.87 
420000 Wholesale trade 1.50 0.48 8.05 0.97 
  Type II Multipliers 
334220 Broadcast and wireless communications equipment 2.27 0.54 10.20 1.22 
335920 Communication and energy wire and cable manufacturing 3.08 0.67 13.85 1.17 
334413 Semiconductor and related device manufacturing 2.27 0.64 11.16 1.34 
541300 Architectural, engineering, and related services 3.02 1.03 21.24 1.66 
334210 Telephone apparatus manufacturing 2.50 0.65 11.89 1.29 
2332C0 Nonresidential structures 2.96 1.04 22.99 1.64 
484000 Truck transportation 2.96 0.88 20.00 1.50 
420000 Wholesale trade 2.45 0.76 15.49 1.50 
Note: The multipliers are from the BEA RIMS II system, where the region of analysis was the contiguous United States. The 2007 
benchmark input-output table for the nation and 2013 regional data were used. 
